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Local utilities and public services in Europe: challenges and 
opportunities
Local utilities represent one of the least studied sub-
ject among the disciplines focused on the transformations of 
network industries and, more generally, on the delivery of local 
public services (LPS). This deficit of attention is not due to 
a lack of relevance, as publicly owned corporations and ins-
titutional public-private partnership represent an important 
phenomenon in many European countries such as Germany, 
Italy, Austria, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries, just 
to name a few. More likely, scholars overlooked public utilities 
because they constitute a difficult topic to deal with. There is no 
homogeneous legal framework at the European level and each 
Member State has its own tradition in regulating the utilities. 
Moreover, even within each national context, reliable databases 
on local utilities often do not exist and, in any case, it is very 
difficult to undertake cross-country comparisons.
The four articles in this special issue confirm the multiface-
ted nature of this subject and open the floor for future reflections 
on the role of local utilities and regulation of LPS in Europe. 
Citroni, Lippi and Profeti highlight the political nature of 
local utilities.  At the crossroad between public ownership and 
market environment, local utilities stand out as complex agents 
that are influenced but also able to affect local regulation. In 
this light Di Giulio and Galanti describe the ongoing regiona-
lization of local public services in Italy. The other two contribu-
tions focus on two classical features concerning the regulation 
of these kinds of markets. Ida and Talit provide insights on the 
building of a market for bus and coach lines in Israel as a driver 
of efficiency. Sokołowski explores the potential of local utilities 
as agents of policy effectiveness in improving energy security.
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Corporatization and politics: why it matters
In recent years the study of the corporatization of 
public agencies has focused extensively on governance 
and regulation issues. Besides this consolidated approach, 
however, empirical studies have also interpreted publicly-
owned companies as attractive arenas for politics, espe-
cially at the local level (Christensen and Laegreid 2011; 
Hodge and Greve 2009). In fact, the creation of municipal 
corporations (often under private law) not only meets the 
need to increase the efficiency of local public services, but 
also provides local administrators with a certain number 
of advantages through the creation of enterprises that leave 
room for political action in a domain usually regarded as 
pertaining to business, or to administration in a broader 
sense. As was the case with privatization (cfr. Feigenbaum 
1994), corporatization can be described not just as a prag-
matic option, but in some cases as strategic or tactical poli-
tical behaviour.
• Firstly, the recourse to private-law companies 
instead of public-law ownership may provide governments 
with “considerable freedom from close public oversight 
and control, legislative and otherwise” (Thynne 2010: 7): 
bypassing bureaucratic processes of decision-making and 
budgeting and democratic chains of accountability, mana-
gers and executive bodies gain in autonomy and discretion.
• Secondly, discretion increases also concerning fu-
ture decisions to restructure or partially divest companies’ 
share capitals (possibly substituting previous costs with 
expected returns), to set inter-governmental collaborative 
ventures (not necessarily avoiding informal networking 
and patronage), and to establish public-private partner-
ships or other forms of strategic alliances (ibidem).
• Corporatisation may also be attractive for the 
benefits it may offer to the political class, especially when 
elected politicians are “puzzling” (Heclo 1974) with su-
pranational or national pressures for reform or are facing 
situations of short-term political uncertainty (and pos-
sibly failure) such as those determined by public finance 
shortages and administrative overloads (King 1975; Peters 
1981). In these critical situations, the shift from direct 
public intervention to the creation of private-law com-
panies at arm’s length from political power may provide 
politicians with the opportunity to take the distance from 
potentially unpopular activities in a context of poor finan-
cial resources, and enable them to avoid responsibility 
and shift the blame (Fiorina 1986) to managers for policy 
errors or unsatisfactory services (Christensen and Pallesen 
2001; Yamamoto 2004). 
• Finally, corporatisation may supply a flexible tool 
to experiment incursions into new fields of policy or with 
new policy partners, creating arenas and stakes that may be 
appealing for strategic coalitions and constituencies (Lippi 
and Profeti 2014).
In short, corporatization may (and does) have a num-
ber of political facets, which derive from the intrinsic 
ambiguity of corporatization itself and are visible in mana-
gement and regulation dynamics, in contract negotiation 
and enforcement, and so on. We focus here on three ways 
through which the use of corporatisation may be part and 
parcel of a number of political strategies: a) the use of cor-
poratisation as a way to limit competition; b) the design 
and actual practice of regulation and control over service 
providers; c) the appointment of members of company 
boards and shareholder assemblies.
“To bid or not to bid?”: corporatisation in lieu of 
competition
The absence of strict or effective EU or national requi-
rements for competitive tendering leaves ample room for 
manoeuvre by local actors (Lippi and Profeti 2014): “to 
bid or not to bid?”, as ran the title of an earlier article by 
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Boitani and Cambini (2006). Thus, one of the most inte-
resting starting points to understand the role of politics in 
the management of local services is to look at local govern-
ments’ attempts to ring-fence the selection of service pro-
viders as well as the renewal of concession contracts.
On the one hand, competitive public tenders are based 
on contracts that last sometimes for decades and are com-
plex and incomplete: this may lead to specific risks (i.e. 
lock-in effects, opportunism etc.) and to the inability of 
the public authority to exercise strict control over service 
delivery. Corporatisation may be perceived as a partial 
solution to this problem: it provides local administrators/
politicians with the opportunity to keep some kind of 
political control over the company, to maintain privileged 
relationships of trust between the municipality and ser-
vice providers, thus perpetuating (or strengthening) local 
networks of influence and consensus-building. On the 
other hand, it also reinforces political consensus by kee-
ping possible external challenges in check: corporatized 
agencies and firms will include selected stakeholders and 
local (or otherwise near) partners, promote industriali-
sation on a local basis, protect local “champions”, all the 
while keeping foreign (or otherwise unwanted) firms at a 
distance.
Different versions of a similar phenomenon may take 
place if the service is assigned directly to ‘in house pro-
viding’ companies, of course, but also when municipally 
owned companies decide to participate in public tenders 
in other territories (at least in countries, like Italy, where 
this is not prohibited), since political relations between 
mayors (and local politicians in general) may soften com-
petition and lay the basis for informal mechanisms of 
regulation and control. Of course, different national legis-
lative frameworks setting the rules to award concessions 
may produce different outcomes, reducing or amplifying 
local politicians’ room for manoeuvre.    
Regulation and control: escape to informality 
The model of regulation that inspired many reforms across 
Europe was intended to produce principal/agent, purcha-
ser/provider or other forms of interaction, which would 
induce optimisation through establishing conflicting goals 
and granting the exercise of control. Known problems 
exist with this model, such as information asymmetries 
that affect the ability of the principal to control the agent, 
or the incompleteness of contracts: these problems are 
all the more stringent when regulatory bodies are small, 
poor or ill-equipped, and service providers gain autonomy 
and influence thanks to greater knowledge and material 
resources.
Apparently, many local decision-makers have little 
hope that the tools of regulation will actually work, or 
would rather not switch to them completely, and make 
ample recourse to two strategies, often combined. On the 
one hand, they do not give up public ownership; they will 
not privatise and regulate, but corporatize and regulate. 
In this way, they avoided a real commitment towards 
regulatory tools, but of course they incur in conflicts of 
interests. This way they are saved the trouble of refining 
tools of regulation, but of course they incur in a conflict 
of interests which directly contradicts the principal/agent, 
purchaser/provider agenda of reform: the regulated com-
pany is owned by the regulator. On the other hand, the 
complex toolkits of evaluation and control, and formal 
relationships in both spheres of regulation and ownership 
are integrated with informal, personal relationships based 
on trust, patronage, party and community politics.
Such shifts between logics and forms of regulation 
clearly determine a re-politicization of interactions in the 
sphere of public utilities and services, as an unexpected 
consequence (or lack of expected ones) deriving from re-
gulatory reform (Citroni 2009; Citroni, Lippi and Profeti 
2015).
Regulators: by appointment only?
This is probably the most obvious - and discussed - 
political facet of corporatization. The creation of compa-
nies separated from the bureaucratic machine goes hand 
in hand with the establishment of new bodies (such as the 
companies’ boards of directors) whose members are selec-
ted and appointed by the local government. In the context 
of an enduring and generalised crisis of legitimacy of poli-
tical parties and other identity-based forms of representa-
tion (Katz and Mair 2002), this extension of “public of-
fice” opportunities may offer politicians and party leaders 
alluring occasions to distribute selective incentives among 
their supporters/allies or within their own party (Pollitt et 
al. 2005: 20), thus favouring their personal empowerment 
and contributing to develop new channels for the recruit-
ment of the political class. This is all the more important 
at the local level, where the proximity among the various 
categories of actors frequently leads to problems like career 
osmosis, ‘revolving doors’ and patronage dynamics, which 
further undermine the independence of «principals» from 
regulated companies and generate improper costs of regu-
lation (Becchis 2003). 
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Concluding remarks
In the previous paragraphs we illustrated the politics of 
corporatisation; what it is theoretically and where it is to be 
found empirically. We pointed out that the persistence of 
politics in regulatory models of governance may be consi-
dered an intrinsic dimension, not just a totally unexpected 
side effect. Regulatory governance leaves room for political 
action, distributing opportunities for political power and 
political practices. The way in which the “politics of corpo-
ratisation” develops and its potential extension depend of 
course on national legislations defining rules for the crea-
tion, functioning and steering of municipal companies, 
as well as on the various sectors and fields in which they 
operate; but it appears that some form of persistence of 
politics can be generalised.
More precisely, we outlined three key issues where the 
politics of corporatisation may be found. First of all, corpo-
ratization may be a way to avoid competition and to create 
hybrid policy arenas. Secondly, corporatization coexists 
with very weak regulation and little formal control, subs-
tituted by informal relations, trust, and political affinity. 
Finally, political appointments to boards and assemblies 
are clearly a stake for politics and a way to set up political 
practices (revolving doors and patronage) in place of inde-
pendent and separate careers. All these three aspects are 
‘windows of opportunity’ for politics and provide chances 
for the mechanism and outcomes described above.
As such, corporatisation matters for three significant 
sets of political consequences. First, the ‘new’ corporatisa-
tion still perpetuates ‘old’ practices. Second, it generates a 
lack of accountability making room for additional politics 
out of the traditional and institutionally defined places for 
democratic politics. Finally, it gives local politicians dis-
cretionary room for manoeuvre well beyond the legal fra-
mework, limiting the autonomy of managers and attrac-
ting managers themselves into the game of politics.
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Introduction
Since the early Nineties, Italy underwent a deep institutio-
nal restructuring. On the one hand, the territorial admi-
nistration has been reformed with increasing decentrali-
zation of administrative functions to local governments; 
moreover in 2001, a constitutional reform decentred im-
portant legislative competences to the regions. In the same 
period of time, the state also attempted a retreat from the 
production and provision of public services through priva-
tizations and corporatization  (Lippi et al. 2008). Twenty 
years have passed since the reforming of Italian local utili-
ties started. As other branches of the national public sec-
tor, the production and provision of public services were 
at that time strongly criticized for their poor performance 
and inefficiencies. Ever since, the national policy aimed 
at modernizing sectors such as local transport, water and 
waste management has been mainly intended to reduce 
the fragmentation of the operators, which was thought 
to be one of local utilities’ main weaknesses (Galanti and 
Moro 2014).
The powdered structure of Italian local utilities, mostly 
characterized by medium and small publicly-owned enter-
prises, played nonetheless an ambivalent role in the very 
process of reform. On the one hand, it provided an argu-
ment for a series of national governments to introduce 
market-oriented policies aimed at creating industrial sy-
nergies. The main strategies adopted relied on incentivising 
corporatization and privatization, while local governments 
(namely municipalities, provinces and their functional 
bodies) have been progressively induced to award services 
through competitive procedures. On the other hand, the 
overall fragmentation of these sectors constituted an ar-
gument for local stakeholders – municipalities and their 
corporations – to strongly lobby national governments to 
keep the possibility of directly commissioning services. 
The outlined dynamic led to mixed results. On the 
one side, local utilities underwent impressive transforma-
tions towards private-like organizational structures. On 
the other, local governments are still largely in control 
of them, so that these firms stand out as hybrid forms of 
organizations, which are private, as far as their legal form 
is considered, even though their strategies seem to still 
be politically driven. This transformation marked thus a 
change from the past, since the traditional channels of ac-
countability have been reshaped (Lippi et al 2008; Citroni 
et al. 2015; Asquer 2014; Citroni and Di Giulio 2014).
Despite this cleavage between national government 
and local stakeholders still characterizing Italy’s utilities 
policy, some relevant changes affecting the governance 
of local public services have occurred since 2011, as the 
financial crisis opened up a window of opportunity for 
the national government to revise its policy. One of the 
directions at the national level entails an empowerment 
of regional governments in the regulation of utilities in 
their territories. Such decentralization – currently in the 
implementation stage – is interesting because it allows us 
to observe Regions’ strategic choices and accounts for their 
divergence. The next two sections describe, respectively, 
the institutional legacy of local utilities’ regulation and the 
directions taken by the Regions since they acquired signi-
ficant regulatory powers.
Legacy 
In the traditional model for water and transport provision, 
each Italian local government was in charge of organiza-
tion, planning and management. The resulting fragmen-
tation of service provision took different patterns across 
the country: in the wealthiest north, municipal enterprise 
was the option of choice; in the centre, direct management 
was the favoured solution, whereas in the south the central 
administration of the state remained the key player in the 
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provision of water. The cost of the service was financed 
through general taxes and related financial transfers from 
the central government to the localities. 
After 1994, this architecture radically changed with 
reforms that introduced a new multi-level governance sys-
tem for water provision and that was largely replicated for 
other Local Public Services (LPS). In order to address the 
fragmentation of the over 5,500 water districts, through 
horizontal integration, economies of scale and scope, the 
State delegated to the Regions the definition of the boun-
daries of ‘Optimal Water Districts’ (Ambiti territoriali otti-
mali, ATO) for the implementation of the integrated water 
and sanitation system. In each ATO, municipalities were 
grouped into an institutional body, the ATO Authority, or 
AATO, which regulated water services by defining invest-
ments and tariffs and monitoring the overall management. 
AATOs granted to companies service concessions as defi-
ned by contract. Finally, the reforms introduced an end-
user tariff policy, covering full costs: running expenses as 
well as maintenance, restoration, and innovation invest-
ments (Lippi et al. 2008: 623-625). With the sole excep-
tion of Toscana (Tuscany), the implemented ATOs corres-
ponded to the territory of existing Provinces. As a result, 
the fragmentation of providers was only slightly reduced, 
while corporatisation and mixed private-public companies 
spread at the local level (Citroni et al. 2012). With res-
pect to regulatory issues, direct awarding and renewal of 
existing concessions prevailed on tenders and on competi-
tive awarding procedures (Massarutto and Ermano 2013; 
Asquer 2014). 
The legal framework of local transportation was refor-
med in 1997, by a centre-left government coalition led 
by Romano Prodi. While regulatory powers over local 
railways were for the first time attributed to the Regions, 
urban and non-urban non-rail passenger services remained 
under the responsibility of local governments, municipali-
ties and provinces, respectively. Moreover, the government 
introduced compulsory tender as the instrument by which 
the Regions and local government were to entrust services, 
in order to reach the target of 35% of cost recovery by 
tariffs revenues. As the Regions started to implement this 
general framework, they did not pay attention to the pos-
sible synergies among transport modes, since they all kept 
separate regional and provincial planning functions. In ad-
dition, the awarding procedures collapsed for railway ser-
vices (Di Giulio 2011), and yielded only poor results for 
urban and provincial services (Autorità di Regolazione dei 
Trasporti 2014). Even in this case, the Provinces remained 
the main planning bodies for all non-railways transports.
Towards regional patterns of regulation
Since the financial crisis in the Eurozone started to hit 
Italy in 2011, three national governments have been in 
power and all have shared the commitment to modernize 
the regulation and management of public services. In par-
ticular, the cabinet led by Mario Monti, in addition to the 
traditional effort to re-introduce compulsory tendering, 
started to modify the broader governance of local utilities. 
With reference to both local transportation and water ser-
vices, thus, the institutional framework is currently evol-
ving from the traditional two-tier structure (State-LGs) to 
more articulated arrangements.
This transformation has two main dimensions. In the 
first place, relevant regulatory powers have been delegated 
to autonomous national authorities. In the case of water, 
some competences over supervision, control and financing 
were then attributed to the existing national authority for 
electricity and gas (now Autorità per l’Energia Elettrica, 
il Gas ed il Servizio Idrico, AEEGSI). A similar process 
took place regarding transportation: an independent regu-
latory agency (Autorità di Regolazione dei Trasporti) was 
established in 2012 with significant powers in defining 
dossier
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Table 1 – Emerging patterns of local regulation in water and local public transports (2015)
Source: authors’ own elaboration. 
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the standards for awarding the procedures that the local 
authorities should follow.
The second dimension, and the one this paper focuses 
on, has to do with the delegation to Regions of relevant 
discretional powers over several key regulatory features, 
especially after 2011. To date, Regions seem to have em-
braced divergent strategies in the re-scaling of the gover-
nance of their services. Table 1 summarizes the regional 
choices with respect to the allocation of planning func-
tions and the boundaries of the territorial areas in which 
services are awarded to providers. The two dimensions 
indicate the degree of centralization that the Region is wil-
ling and able to pursue. 
With respect to centralisation, Regions can be grou-
ped differently according to the different policy styles that 
emerge from the choices they made in the different LPS 
sectors (Citroni, Lippi and Profeti 2015b). The Regions of 
the Centre present a dirigiste attitude, though with some 
remarkable differences between sectors. In general, this 
proactive attitude implies a centralisation of some regula-
tory competences such as planning, monitoring and vigi-
lance at the regional level within a brand new Regional 
Authority, while delegating the organization of the ser-
vices to local governments in the Province. In Toscana, the 
choice to create a unique regional district and to entitle a 
new authority for the regulatory functions was the result 
of a tendency that started well before the financial crisis. 
Former ATOs for water services aggregated the territories 
of more than one province, resulting into 6 supra-provin-
cial water districts. At first, the concessions for the water 
and sanitation systems were directly awarded to corpora-
tized local utilities. In addition, also the very ownership 
structures of these companies were opened to competition, 
with tenders for the selection of private industrial and fi-
nancial partners. In 2015, the dimension of water service 
districts for concessions is still handled at the supra-pro-
vincial level. In the case of transport, Toscana is currently 
implementing an even more centralizing policy, having 
constituted one unique district for the whole Region. 
Indeed, a rather conservative and non-interventionist 
attitude has been showed by the Northern Regions, cha-
racterised by a strongly fragmented industrial structure of 
mixed private and public companies in both sectors. The 
Piemonte (Piedmont) and Veneto Regions maintained 
the districts of provincial or supra-provincial dimensions, 
creating neither the unique ATO nor the new Regional 
Authority. The Region of Lombardia (Lombardy) limits 
the scope of its actions to the coordination of local actors, 
letting local governments choose the dimension of the ser-
vice areas, which can range from provincial to municipal 
dimensions. Interestingly, in Friuli Venezia-Giulia districts 
of provincial dimensions remain for issues of water but not 
for transport, where the Region opted for a unique dis-
trict. Overall, the legacy of strong fragmentation in service 
provision in the North still holds. 
In the South of the Peninsula, a choice in favour of 
wider regional ATOs for water can be found in the legis-
lations of Abruzzo, Molise, Basilicata and Calabria, even 
though implementation of recent regulation is exposed 
to a number of uncertainties, linked to local political 
conflicts and the fact that at the time of the restructuring 
of LPS governance, those Regions were ruled by State spe-
cial commissioners. It is therefore plausible that the design 
of regional wide ATOs might be a top-down authoritative 
decision inspired by the national government. In the field 
of transport, the size of the districts remained mainly at 
the provincial level, thus mirroring the existing fragmenta-
tion of service operators. A conservative attitude far from 
the overall regional steering seems to be that of the Lazio 
Region, where the boundaries of the water and transport 
districts remain at the provincial level. Puglia, conversely, 
represents a case of particular Regional activism. Since the 
very first implementation of water reforms, this Region 
promoted the institution of a unique ATO, whereas dis-
tricts remained at the provincial dimension in the trans-
port domain.
Rescaling for efficiency’s sake?
The emergence of regional patterns in two sectors such as 
transport and water, characterized by different business 
and technological requirements, might raise doubts on the 
very drivers of regional regulation.
According to the basic assumptions of transportation 
economics, while centralizing strategic planning might 
make sense, the choice of some Regions to create a single 
traffic area comprehensive of both urban and extra-ur-
ban lines is hard to justify on the sole basis of efficiency 
gains. In those cases where such a decision had been made, 
namely Umbria, Toscana, and Liguria, it seemed to have 
been aimed at easing the process of merging existing (and 
mostly loss-making) companies. The first mover, in this 
direction, was the Umbria Region that promoted the 
integration of four locally owned transportation compa-
nies, which in 2010 merged into Umbria Mobilità. After 
that, in 2012, the Region emended the legal framework 
concerning local transport creating a single traffic area 
and, two years later, Busitalia, a subsidiary of the Italian 
State Railways, took over the controlling share of Umbria 
Mobilità. A similar pattern is currently at work in Toscana, 
Liguria and Campania, where the design of a single traffic 
area seems to emerge as a strategy to consolidate specific 
operators, rather than creating efficiency through compe-
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titive dynamics. The Italian Competition Authority has 
repetitively expressed concerns in this respect, advising 
those Regions to award services on the basis of more than 
one traffic areas. Nonetheless, Toscana has recently closed 
a tender in which all local transportation services – urban 
and non-urban – were awarded in a single bundle: an 
11 years concession with subsidies amounting to €4 bn. 
Only two players made a bid: on the one hand Busitalia 
in cooperation with the majority of incumbents and, and 
on the other Autolinee Toscane, an Italian subsidiary of 
the French RATP Group, already running services in the 
Region. The latter won the tender, thanks to a 3% reduc-
tion on the bidding price, against the 1.75% offered by its 
competitor.
In the water sector, the picture of the regulatory gover-
nance and the actual dimension of service areas are more 
confused. As a matter of fact, the choices of the Regions 
to define a unique ATO and to centralise planning and 
monitoring functions in Regional Authorities do not auto-
matically imply the awarding of concessions through com-
petitive tenders within a unique water district for all the 
regional territory. To a certain degree, the recent choices 
only aim at reinforcing the regulatory role of the Region. 
Moreover, the presence of numerous incumbents at the 
municipal level as providers makes the expansion of the 
boundaries a tricky task. Thus, rather than intervening on 
the dimension of water district areas, political actors pur-
sue the reduction of fragmentation by merging incumbent 
municipal providers, while leaving the dimension of the 
former ATOs at the provincial or at the sub-provincial 
level. The most explicit attempt to promote industrial 
aggregation through the redesign of the boundaries was 
made by the Toscana Region, which aggregated the for-
mer ATOs into 6 supra-provincial districts. Competitive 
tendering for the services provided by the incumbents was 
then opened. 
The recent creation of a unique regional ATO in seve-
ral regions mirrors the on-going process for the rationa-
lisation of local public and mixed owned utilities (Bussu 
and Galanti 2015). In accordance with recent State direc-
tives, the industrialisation of the water providers should 
be pursued by fostering mergers and acquisitions among 
the local utilities, which are often controlled by the local 
governments as main shareholders. As a matter of fact, the 
mergers of local utilities could also allow a more proac-
tive role of the Regions in designing wider service areas 
and then in opening them to competitive tenders. This 
scenario is more plausible in contexts were the number 
of incumbent providers has already been reduced, such 
as in Toscana and Emilia Romagna, where few providers 
control most of the former ATOs. Conversely, it seems less 
plausible in the North, where the aggregation of service 
providers is limited and the size of service areas remains at 
the municipal and provincial level, such as in the cases of 
Lombardia, Veneto and Piemonte.  
Concluding remarks
Despite the fact that Italian Regions are still implementing 
their own regulatory governance of local utilities, some 
conclusions from the reforms can be drawn. Firstly, regio-
nal governments have increased their regulatory powers 
over utilities. Secondly, even if only some of them seem 
to be effectively intentioned to centralize the governance 
of local services, it is not unlikely that in a near future 
other Regions might adopt similar strategies. This pheno-
menon constitutes thus a crucial aspect for both national 
regulators and stakeholders to deal with, even in light of 
the concurrent empowerment of the national autonomous 
agencies of several regulatory powers that were previously 
held by the government. Whether the increasing com-
plexity of the institutional framework local utilities ope-
rate in will foster a more sustainable business environment 
or not, remains an open question.
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Introduction
During the last decades, many countries have imple-
mented reforms in public bus services. The main reasons 
were rising service costs (Hensher and Houghton 2004), 
and a decline in ridership, mainly due to the transition 
to widespread use of private vehicles. In most locations, 
the reforms were accompanied by changes in regulato-
ry structure, corresponding to changes in the industry 
(Hensher and Stanley 2010; Hidson and Muller 2003; 
Van de Velde and Wallis 2013).
Examination of regulatory arrangements revealed 
significant geographic differences in regulatory environ-
ments, which affected liberalization and entry options 
of the market (Steer Davies Gleaves 2009). The United 
Kingdom chose a «big bang» approach in 1980. Sweden 
opted for more gradual change, Norway for pragmatism, 
and Italy for an incomplete approach (Van de Velde 
2013).
Liberalization and deregulation of the bus sector was 
perceived as successful in those European countries that 
implemented it (Van de Velde 2013). Reforms usually 
produced considerable savings in costs mainly due to 
substantial reductions in bus drivers’ wages (Walters 
2010). Results varied concerning service levels, fares, and 
ridership figures (Ida and Talit 2015). Different objec-
tives of transportation authorities also produced different 
tender characteristics, which served as available tools for 
regulators.
Bus reform results in Israel
In Israel, two cooperatives have been supplying 96% of 
public bus transportation for many years. In 2000, public 
transportation reform was introduced. The main objec-
tives were to improve economic efficiency of bus services 
in order to provide the necessary resources required to im-
prove the scope and the quality of service and to increase 
ridership figures.
In 2012, eight new operators, selected through a process 
of competitive tendering, accounted for 34% of industry 
activity (in terms of vehicle kilometers), and by 2017 their 
portion is expected to increase to 45%. Examination of 
the results shows that the average kilometer cost per vehi-
cle decreased by 37% to 50%. The main savings resulted 
from reduced wages, mainly that of drivers (Ida and Talit 
2015). In most bus clusters included in the tenders, the 
level of service (scope) and ridership increased, and quality 
of service improved, while some bus fares decreased.  
The main changes in level of service, fares and ridership are 
presented in Table 1.
Discussion
The Israeli experience in competitive tendering of public 
bus services seems to be quite successful in terms of cost sa-
vings, improvement of service quality, and increased rider-
ship. However, the reform was accompanied by frequent 
changes in tender characteristics, such as: division of regu-
latory authority, type of contract, contract duration. These 
changes may reflect problems with government regulation 
or incongruity between tender characteristics and their 
defined purposes. 
In most of the European Countries, local authorities 
traditionally provided urban public transport, either di-
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rectly or through associated companies. This corresponds 
to the insight that public transport is a social service provi-
ded by public authorities to ensure a certain level of mobi-
lity for everybody (Hidson and Muller 2003). In addition, 
operators’ involvement on the tactical level (setting routes, 
fares, frequencies) is associated with improved service and 
increased ridership (Hensher and Stanley 2010). 
In Israel, the transportation authorities were always 
concentrated at the national level, by the Ministry of 
Transportation (Ida and Talit 2014). In addition, the 
dearth of operators’ involvement on the tactical level pre-
vents the transportation authority from utilizing opera-
tors’ knowledge and experience. This situation may impair 
the ability to maintain an effective regulatory mechanism 
that will provide an appropriate level of service to users in 
different regions.
Recognition of these drawbacks has led to regula-
tory change. Recently, a National Transport Authority 
was formed in Israel. It will operate as a Ministry of 
Transport Support Unit, whose role will be to ensure ope-
ration of a broad, effective public transportation system, 
according to government policy (Ministry of Transport 
2007). Subsequently, four Metropolitan Transportation 
Authorities will be founded to provide local transit services.
Risk distribution between the transportation authority 
and the operators is defined as part of the contracts. In 
a gross-cost contract, the operator only bears the “pro-
duction risk”, namely, the risk of producing a set output, 
regardless of passenger figures. These contracts are consi-
dered as relatively low cost to the transit authority. In a 
net-cost contract, the operator receives income from sel-
ling services while bearing the “revenue risk”.  Thus, these 
contracts are considered as more motivating for operators 
to improve service and increase ridership (Muren 2000). 
Although, until 2010, all Israeli tenders were net-cost, 
the cost-and-demand structure did not induce operators to 
improve the quality of the service. Consequently, in 2010, 
the transportation authority switched to gross-cost tenders 
(Ida and Talit 2014). To motivate operators further, the 
authority included incentives to increase passenger figures 
within the tenders (Amaral, Saussier and Yvrande-Billon 
2009).
Another important tender component is the contract 
duration. Long contract duration reduces average cost 
per unit, facilitates financing and capital investment, pro-
ducing improvements in workforce and equipment, and 
ensuring job security, particularly for drivers. However, 
this may not promote good service, since long contract 
duration reinforces the operator as a regional monopoly 
(Muren 2000). Low tender frequency also reduces the 
introduction of changes in technology or demand. 
Initial contract duration in Israel was six years, later 
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Table 1. Change in level of service, fares, and ridership figures in Israel, 2000-2010 (%)
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extended to eight. In the last four tenders, the contract 
period was six years with two possible extensions of three 
years each. These extensions may prevent a regional mo-
nopoly, provided that operators do not consider them 
automatic extension mechanisms. However, if extension 
depends on performance, operator insecurity may ensue.
In order to choose the most appropriate operator the 
transport authority usually uses a two-stage process. First 
comes initial screening, designed to bar operators lacking 
financial solidity and previous experience. Yet the scree-
ning may also impair competition by discriminating 
against small companies. While the regulator’s preference 
for financial strength and economies of scale is understan-
dable, it may hinder competition and increase collusion 
among operators. This situation might ultimately produce 
regional monopolies that impair efficiency and service 
standards. 
Determination of the winning criteria is the second 
stage of the process. Standards must reflect the regulator’s 
goals and their relative importance. For example, since 
there is a trade-off relationship between savings in cost 
and the ability to maintain a good level of service (Muren 
2000), focusing on bids that cut costs and subsidies may 
impair the improvement of the service. Criteria for selec-
ting Israeli operators have changed over time for several 
reasons. Particularly notable was (a) the 2004-2010 shift 
in emphasis from reducing fares and increasing the scope 
of service to saving on subsidies. This change was ordered 
by the Israeli Ministry of Finance to save public expendi-
ture on service delivery. From 2010, the criteria focused 
on cost savings and on the service proposed, with relatively 
greater weight ascribed to operational programs that defi-
ned standards of service. This change expresses the trend 
led by the Ministry of Transport to strengthen bus ser-
vices, partly under pressure from Israeli NGOs that are 
interested in promoting this issue; (b) preventing dum-
ping bids and renegotiation after tender awards; and (c) 
linking subsidy levels to ridership figures.
During the contract period, an efficient supervision 
and control system is essential to maintain service stan-
dards. In 2006 Israel adopted two measures to regulate 
quality assurance and service continuity. One considered 
operational control score and past experience of operators; 
the other included drivers’ wages and plans for investment 
in training. Inclusion of the operators’ standard-of-service 
score as a criterion for tender award, and increasing its re-
lative weight from 5% to 17%, significantly increased the 
importance of the regulatory instrument. However, the 
standard of service index does not include passenger pre-
ference surveys, which show the importance of different 
elements of the index (Hensher and Prioni 2002). The 
relatively low number of bus trips measured for each ope-
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rator (about 0.4% of all rides) is another disadvantage of 
this supervision and control system, which may not deter 
operators from deviating from required standards. 
Conclusion
Competitive tendering may effectively save costs of pro-
viding and improving public bus service. International 
differences in tender characteristics and service levels stem 
from different priorities regarding how to use resources 
that are saved because of competitive tendering.
In Israel, tender characteristics have changed frequent-
ly over the years in order to improve regulatory capabilities 
and to attain different objectives. The recent establishment 
of the National Transportation Authority and the future 
establishment of four Metropolitan Transport Authorities 
may improve regulation capabilities. Since the declared 
objective of the Israeli government is to promote bus ser-
vices and increase the number of passengers, it seems that 
several characteristics still delay the achievement of these 
goals: (a) division of authority between the regulator and 
the operators is not optimal. Distance of the regulator from 
service end points and exclusion of operators from tactical 
level involvement still hinder service improvements and 
increased ridership; (b) diminishing the number of com-
panies in the market may reduce competition; (c) exten-
ding contract periods may reduce competition levels in the 
medium to long run. It is premature to assess the impact of 
a short contract period with two possible extensions that 
are subject to operator performance; and (d) the operatio-
nal control index does not include consumer preference 
surveys, which help reflect the value of service standards 
to consumers. 
Implementing appropriate changes in future tenders 
may contribute to the goals of improving public bus ser-
vices and of benefitting passengers. 
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Introduction
Local public energy utilities have a great potential in terms 
of increasing the level of the local energy security. This, 
according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), may 
be defined as “the uninterrupted availability of energy 
sources at an affordable price”. Nevertheless, “[e]nergy 
security has many dimensions: long-term energy security 
mainly deals with timely investments to supply energy in 
line with economic developments and sustainable envi-
ronmental needs. Short-term energy security focuses on 
the ability of the energy system to react promptly to sud-
den changes within the supply-demand balance” (IEA). 
In this discussion, one may look at energy security at 
the international and national level, as well as at the local 
dimension. As far as the local dimension is concerned, 
energy security relates to the needs of local communities. 
This may be done in various ways, but almost all of 
them are related to improvements of local energy infras-
tructure (either grid or production units), that very often 
involves usage of local energy resources. Herein, the local 
energy utilities are the answer, as they may use local ener-
gy resources, produce energy locally, as well as deliver it 
locally. Because of their dispersed nature, these kinds of 
sources are among those closest to citizens. Due to their 
smaller scale of investment, the installation of local ener-
gy units is very often quicker and easier, as well as a more 
sustainable due to the use of renewable fuels. 
In light of this, this paper aims at analysing the main 
European strategic documents and legislation related to 
the issue of the local energy usage in power units owned 
by the local governments. The paper juxtaposes them 
with the circumstances influencing the development of 
local public energy utilities and their role for the issue of 
local energy security. 
European Resources and Local Energy Sources
There are many indications that the European Union is 
committed to the development of local energy generation, 
as local energy units tie together a number of issues like 
improvements of energy efficiency, growth of renewable 
energy usage, reduction of greenhouse gases emissions, as 
well as usage of indigenous energy resources. Particularly, 
in the context of energy security, this latter element is 
crucial. 
According to the priorities of the May 2013 European 
Council “[i]t remains crucial to further intensify the diver-
sification of Europe’s energy supply and develop indige-
nous energy resources to ensure security of supply, reduce 
the EU’s external energy dependency and stimulate eco-
nomic growth” (European Council 2013: 4). To enhance 
energy security, apart from finding new sources of supply, 
the EU focuses on increasing the usage of its own resources, 
as it is heavily dependent on external supplies. In 2008 the 
EU primary energy consumption represented 1800 Mtoe, 
whereas the EU own energy production covered 850 Mtoe 
(European Commission 2010b: 13). Moreover, the ove-
rall EU import dependency has increased (natural gas +6 
p.p and crude oil +3 p.p. between 1995-2012) (European 
Commission 2014d: 21). Between 1995-2012 indigenous 
crude oil production decreased from 160 Mtoe to 71 
Mtoe (European Commission 2014d: 29). With respect 
to natural gas production decreased from 200 Mtoe in the 
late 90ties to the level of below 150 Mtoe in 2012 mar-
king the lowest level since 1995 (European Commission 
2014d: 41).
In terms of various kinds of indigenous energy sources, 
in the EU’s strategic documents on energy one may find 
that “the most indigenous resource with greatest fuel diver-
sity” is renewable energy (European Commission 2014d: 
10). Despite some concerns linked with the variable na-
ture of wind and solar power resulting in challenges in 
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terms of their reliability (European Commission 2014d: 
10), the EU perceives it as a preferable source of energy. It 
has an important role to play not only in securing indige-
nous energy supplies but also in tackling climate change 
(European Commission 2010b: 13). Decreasing oil and 
gas production in the EU makes exploitation of indige-
nous energy sources inevitable, although these sources 
need to be “sustainable.” Thereby, “[c]ontributions may 
come from renewable energy sources”. Nevertheless, the 
EU qualifies herein also “domestic reserves of conventio-
nal and unconventional fossil fuels (primarily natural gas) 
and nuclear according to Member State preferences over 
their energy mix and within the framework of an inte-
grated market with undistorted competition” (European 
Commission 2014a: 11). 
In the EU, the use of renewable energies in propor-
tion to the total energy consumption has increased from 
8.7% in 2005 to 14.1% in 2012 (European Commission 
2014d: 163). This means that the EU’s energy produced 
at local has grown and the dependency on energy imports 
has decreased. The electricity sector was the main driver 
for this change of tendency (the share of EU produced 
renewable electricity increased from 15% to 24% between 
2005-2012) (European Commission 2014d: 163). 
The share of renewable energy sources (RES) is also 
influenced by the local energy utilities. “In 2013, German 
local public utilities had 3000 MW installed RES capacity, 
which constituted an increase of 32% from the previous 
year; [i]n Italy, local companies own 2,400 MW in hydro-
power plants and 2,500 MW of biomass plants, consti-
tuting 13% and 50% of respective installed capacities on 
national level” (CEDEC 2015: 6). Certainly, apart from 
the EU policy, the policies pursued at national level have a 
great impact on this expansion. For instance, the German 
Energiewende that determined changes for the so-called 
“Big Four” (i.e. German main national operators) might 
represent an opportunity for development of the local 
energy utilities (Schlandt 2015), also those owned by the 
local authorities. 
Naturally, as already mentioned, renewable energy 
sources are not the only way to improve energy security in 
the EU. “Many stakeholders agree that Europe should fur-
ther diversify its energy supply sources and routes, though 
there is no consensus on the sources with some stakehol-
ders focusing on shale gas, while others note that focus 
should be on indigenous renewables resources and energy 
efficiency” (European Commission 2014b: 202-203). 
However, because of the EU climate and energy policy and 
its support to the development of renewable generation, 
stakeholders choose local renewable energy sources as they 
“increase the security of supply by reducing dependence 
on imported fossil fuels” (European Commission 2014b: 
dossier
202-203). Moreover, “NGOs and most of the renewable 
and non-energy intensive industrial associations, trade 
unions and companies are stressing that renewables and 
energy efficiency offer specific advantages in terms of job 
creation, competitiveness and innovation” (European 
Commission 2014b: 221). Thus, the new energy scenario 
of greater European energy independence will not happen 
without the development of new technologies. “These 
new technologies are needed to further reduce primary 
energy demand, diversify and consolidate supply options 
(both external and indigenous), and to optimise energy 
network infrastructure to fully benefit from this diversifi-
cation” (European Commission 2014c: 14). Investments 
in research and innovation may lead to inventions of new 
energy storage solutions or improvements in local heating 
systems (European Commission 2014c: 14).
Adopted by the EU, policy frames open a window of 
opportunity for local public energy utility. Due to their 
scale of operation, much smaller than the system sources, 
they fit into the development of renewable generation. 
The local public energy utilities may choose between 
unconventional energy sources to supply a significant part 
of their energy consumers. With the help of national or 
European funds, they may finance investments in moder-
nisation of former conventional energy units. Finally, 
they may benefit from the system of support of renewable 
energy. Naturally, it does not mean that every local energy 
source must be of a renewable character, as the Member 
States can shape their energy mix under the Article 194 (2) 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
Local public energy utilities also greatly contribute to 
improvements of energy efficiency. In many European 
countries (especially Central and Eastern Europe as well 
as Northern Europe) apart from generating electricity the 
local energy utilities deliver heat. For instance, in 2013 in 
Germany, local energy utilities generated one third of their 
electricity in cogeneration processes; in Austria, 30 TWh 
of heat and 20 TWh of electricity are annually produced 
in this way (CEDEC 2015). Moreover, combining heat 
and power has a potential to significantly increase energy 
efficiency. Additionally, because of this cogeneration, the 
combined heat and power (CHP) units emit less green-
house gases. For example, “[t]he highly-efficient plants 
reach an efficiency factor of 80-90% and helped to reduce 
Austria’s CO₂ emission by 4 million tons in 2012 at relati-
vely low cost” (CEDEC 2015).
With or Without Decentralised Energy Systems 
Presented circumstances show the possible direction 
for future development of the decentralised energy systems 
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in the EU. It is quite clear that this process will be driven 
by two main factors: the growth of renewable generation 
and improvements of energy efficiency. The combination 
of these two drivers will be beneficial. As stated in the sixth 
recital of the preamble to Directive 2009/28/EC “[t]he 
move towards decentralised energy production has many 
benefits, including the utilisation of local energy sources, 
increased local security of energy supply, shorter transport 
distances and reduced energy transmission losses. Such 
decentralisation also fosters community development and 
cohesion by providing income sources and creating jobs 
locally.”
Advantages of the decentralised energy systems made 
them attractive for local communities. Policies to decen-
tralise energy supplies mean that the local governments 
are consulted more often and have a direct impact upon 
the type and location of energy units (Johnston 2012). 
Thereby, “[l]ocal and regional authorities are calling for 
measures to be adopted at the most appropriate level of 
government. From their perspective EU energy policy 
should incentivise and support local sustainable energy 
production and distribution” (European Commission 
2014b: 210). 
However, the decentralised energy system does not 
mean moving away completely from centralised energy 
systems (or rather central units for the needs of the ener-
gy system). These two approaches are complementary; 
as rightly stated in the EU’s strategy “Energy Roadmap 
2050” “centralised large-scale systems such as e.g. nuclear 
and gas power plants and decentralised systems will increa-
singly have to work together. In the new energy system, a 
new configuration of decentralised and centralized large-
scale systems needs to emerge and will depend on each 
other, for example, if local resources are not sufficient or 
are varying in time” (European Commission 2011: 8). 
Because the local energy sources are dependent on the 
internal (breakdowns, repairs, power shortages, etc.) or ex-
ternal factors (unstable powers like wind or sun, increased 
demand, and so on), there is the need to stabilise each 
local energy system with the use of central units to support 
local energy systems whenever it is necessary. 
Modern Energy Systems and Smart Cities
 Looking at the status of the energy sector one may pose 
a question: who should be the leader of transitions in the 
energy system? The European policy approach is based 
on an active role of the public entities, which should be 
at the forefront of changes (it does not exclude private 
stakeholders, but imposes an obligation for public enti-
ties). This is confirmed in numerous strategic documents 
dossier
as well as in the law. For example, as addressed in the stra-
tegy “Energy 2020” “[t]he public sector needs to lead by 
example. Ambitious objectives ought to be set for public 
sector consumption. Public procurement should support 
energy efficient outcomes. Innovative integrated energy 
solutions at local level contributing towards transition to 
so-called ‘smart cities’ should be supported. Municipalities 
represent a major actor of the required change, thus their 
initiatives like the Covenant of Mayors should be further 
strengthened. Cities and urban areas, which consume up 
to 80% of the energy, are at the same time part of the pro-
blem and part of the solution to greater energy efficiency” 
(European Commission 2010a: 7).
To support local urban development, the European 
Commission launched a pan-European project on smart 
cities, aimed at gathering “the best from the areas of re-
newable energies, energy efficiency, smart electricity grids, 
clean urban transport such as electro mobility, smart hea-
ting and cooling grids, combined with highly innova-
tive intelligence and ICT tools” (European Commission 
2010a: 16). Established in 2011 the European Innovation 
Partnership on Smart Cities and Communities (EIP-
SCC) lists among its ambitions, inter alia, the integration 
of “local solutions within a European or global market, 
by aggregating local demand and developing common 
solutions” (European Innovation Partnership 2013: 19). 
Such integration of local solutions would foster “a more 
modular approach to local ecosystem solutions, which 
can be used in cities throughout Europe, and thus define 
a European market for smart city solutions, technologies 
and products” (European Innovation Partnership 2013: 
19).
Local public energy utilities, being very close to end-
users, are in a very good position for aggregating local 
demand. Their independence from central government 
give them possibilities for bottom-up actions covering all 
mentioned fields, i.e. renewable energy, energy efficiency, 
smart electricity grids, clean urban transport, smart hea-
ting and cooling grids, etc. As they act locally, they take 
care of local problems like energy poverty of local house-
holds or need of energy advice (CEDEC 2015: 6).
Conclusion: Act Local
The development of new energy technologies provides an 
opportunity to transfer the discussion on energy security 
to the local level. Thereby, the local public energy utili-
ties play an important role in ensuring energy security of 
local communities. Building dispersed energy sources, for 
instance renewable generation, allows local authorities to 
become more independent from central energy units, and 
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national energy companies. As a result, they foster compe-
titiveness of firms in the energy market. 
Moreover, energy generation that is closer to final users 
reduces the problem of energy losses in transmission and 
enables faster rebuilding of the energy system in the event 
of emergencies. With the possibilities of supplying not 
only electricity but also heat, they may improve energy 
efficiency as well as reduce emission of greenhouse gases. 
Of course, the development of the local public ener-
gy utilities may be difficult, and the local energy sources 
might not be able to compete with big energy companies. 
One the one hand, impediments for local public energy 
utilities may arise: for instance, it might be difficult to cap-
ture the full potential of renewable energy; there might be 
a lack of heat demand; there could be the need to conduct 
additional, costly investments. Furthermore, it should not 
be forgotten that the local public energy utilities, as being 
owned by local authorities, act for the public needs, and 
an important aspect of their business is meeting the needs 
of local communities. Among them the energy security 
exists.
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Managemnet of Urban Infrastructures
A Massive Open Online Course by EPFL - MIR - IGLUS
The Chair Management of Network Industries at Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), direc-
ted by Prof. Matthias Finger, is happy to announce the release of the first free Massive Open Online Course 
(MOOC), on February 16th 2016, on the Management of Urban Infrastructures. This course is offered by EPFL, 
and diffused through the Coursera platform. The MUI MOOC provides an introduction to the principles of 
urban infrastructures management. In this MOOC, which is one of the outcomes of the IGLUS project, you will 
hear learn these principles from practitioners (City of Geneva, Veolia, Boston Consulting Group, CarPostal), 
Experts (The World Bank) and Academics (EPFL, CUNY). You can find more information about the course by 
Clicking here.
The Course is structured in four blocks:
• Block1: Introduction to Urban Infrastructures
• Block2: Basic principles in management of Urban Infrastructures
• Block3: Management of Urban Energy Infrastructure
• Block4: Management of Urban mobility Infrastructure
Besides fulfilling the mandatory requirements to obtain the course certificate from Coursera, the participants 
can also write an optional case study to win a prize! The 3 best case studies will win a tuition waiver scholar-
ship to enroll in the IGLUS professional training program in Fall 2016.
You can now subscribe for the MOOC here. Please follow us on Facebook and Twitter to get the latest updates 
from the MOOC and the IGLUS project!
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Call for Papers
5th Conference on the Regulation of Infrastructures
The de- and re-regulation of the different network industries is an ongoing process at national and global 
levels. As this process unfolds, ever new phenomena emerge. Yet, the question about the right mixture 
between market, economic, technical and social regulation remains wide open in all the network industries. 
The question becomes even more challenging when looking at recent infrastructure development as trig-
gered by their pervasive digitalization. Not only are the different infrastructures transformed by their digi-
talization – e.g., digital transport, smart energy, etc. – calling for new approaches to regulating them, but 
moreover does digitalization become a phenomenon in its own right. The European Commission actually sees 
digitalization as a means to accelerate integration, to tear down regulatory walls and to move from 28 natio-
nal markets to a single one. Consequently, digitalization and especially its implications in terms of privacy and 
security also require regulatory attention.
This 5th Florence Conference on the Regulation of Infrastructures aims at taking stock of the major challenges 
infrastructure regulation is currently facing in the age of their rapid digitalization. It does so by:
• looking at the main infrastructure sectors, notably telecommunications, postal services, electricity, gas, 
railways, air transport, urban public transport, as well as water distribution and sanitation; growing 
intermodality among infrastructures, notably as a result of their digitalization;
• looking at infrastructure and their regulation from various disciplinary approaches, notably engineering, 
economics, law and political science along with interdisciplinary approaches are particularly encou-
raged; and 
• linking an academic approach with practical relevance; policy relevant research papers are again parti-
cularly encouraged.
Finally, we especially welcome papers that link technology and institutions in more than one infrastructure 
sector, as to allow comparisons and highlight cross-sectoral trends. Interested junior academics – advanced 
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PhD students, PostDocs and Assistant Professors – along with academically minded practitioners are particu-
larly encouraged to participate. 
Publication opportunity
• Conference Proceedings include all the abstracts presented at the Conference and are listed in the publi-
cations of the Florence School of Regulation.
• Outstanding papers will have the chance to be published in the dedicated issue of the Network Industries 
Quarterly (Issue 18, Vol 3, September 2016). This will be included in Cadmus - the EUI Research Reposi-
tory.
• Furthermore, building on the feedbacks and comments received at the Conference, selected authors will 
be invited to submit their papers for a Special Issue of Utilities Policy.
Unique Conference Format
Following the successful experience of the 4th edition, the format of the Florence Conference on the Regu-
lation of Infrastructures is unique:
• each presenter has 45’, which includes 20’ of presentation, 10’ of qualified feedback and 15’ of discussion 
with the audience (there are only 2 papers per session, guaranteeing high quality);
• feedback will be given by senior professors associated with the Florence School of Regulation, who are 
specifically knowledgeable about the topic at hand;
• papers that will be retained for publication will receive additional feedback beyond the Conference. 
Guidelines for the abstract: 600-1000 words, structured as follows
• title of the paper & keywords;
• name of the author(s) and full address of the corresponding author;
• the aim and methodology of the paper;
• results obtained or expected; 
Timeline
• submission of the abstract until January 17th 2016 (word format download the guidelines here) using the 
online form. For any issue regarding the submission, please contact Ms Nadia Bert at fsr.transport@eui.
eu; 
• notification of acceptance by February 17th 2016;
• submission of the full paper by May 24th 2016; participants who fail to comply with this deadline will be 
automatically removed from the programme.
Scientific Committee
• Prof. Matthias Finger (EPFL and EUI, Director of the Transport Area of FSR) 
• Prof. Jean-Michel Glachant (Director of the Energy Area of FSR) 
• Prof. Leigh Hancher (Director of the EU Energy Law & Policy Area)
• Prof. Xavier Labandeira (Director of FSR Climate)
• Prof. Pier Luigi Parcu (EUI, Director of the Communications and Media Area of FSR)
• Prof. Ignacio Pérez Arriaga (MIT, Comillas and EUI, Director of the Energy Training of FSR)
• Prof. Stéphane Saussier (IAE de Paris and EUI, Director of the Water Area of FSR)
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The Transport Area of the Florence School of Regulation
The Florence School of Regulation (FSR) has been created in 2004 as a partnership between the European 
University Institute (EUI) and the Council of the European Energy Regulators (CEER). Since then, the Florence 
School of Regulation has expanded from Energy regulation to Telecommunications and Media (2009), Trans-
port (2010) and Water (2014).
The Transport Area of the Florence School of Regulation (FSR Transport) is concerned with the regulation of 
all the transport modes and transport markets (including the relationship among them). It currently focuses 
on regulation and regulatory policies in railways, air transport, urban public transport, intermodal transport, 
as well as postal and delivery services.
The aim of FSR Transport is:
• to freely discuss topics of concern to regulated firms, regulators and the European Commission by way of 
stakeholder workshops;
• to involve all the relevant stakeholders in such discussions; and
• to actively contribute to the evolution of European regulatory policy by way of research.
The core activity of FSR Transport is the organization of policy events, where representatives of the European 
Commission, regulatory authorities, operators, other stakeholders, as well as academics in the field meet to 
shape regulatory policy in matters of European transport.
The results of FSR Transport’s activities are disseminated by way of policy briefs, working papers and acade-
mic publications. All FSR Transport materials are open source and available on the FSR Transport webpage, as 
they aim to involve professors, young academics and practitioners to become part of a unique open platform 
for applied research. 
To learn more visit our website: www.florence-school.eu or contact us at FSR.Transport@eui.eu.
Latest event:
Date Title
29 February 2016 4th Florence Intermodal Forum
9 March 2016 Executive Seminar at the World ATM Congress in Madrid
 2 May 2016 12th Florence Rail Forum
24 June 2016 5th Conference on the Regulation of Infrastructures
For more information about our activities please contact: FSR.Transport@eui.eu.
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4th Conference on the Regulation of Infrastructures
Continuing the successful format, the 4th Conference on the Regulation of Infras-
tructures took place on Friday, 12th June and brought together all research areas of 
the Florence School of Regulation to discuss current challenges in the regulation of 
the Infrastructure Industries. Watch the highlights and download the presentations!
The call for papers for the next edition of this Conference is now open! 
FSR-Transport events Spring 2016: 
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Network Industries Quarterly, Vol. 18, issue 1, 2016 (March) “achievements and current challenges 
regarding public utilities’ regulation in Brazil” 
The forthcoming edition of Network Industries’ Quarterly will be a special edition focused in Brazil. 
Our aim is to provide the reader with an overview of the achievements and current challenges regar-
ding public utilities’ regulation in the country. It shall be edited by Patrícia Sampaio, Joísa Dutra and 
Edson Gonçalves, professors at Getulio Vargas Foundation in Rio de Janeiro, an institution ranked 
as the most prestigious think tank in Latin America according to Global Go To Think Tanks Rankings 
2014.
Brazil is the seventh largest economy in the world in terms of GDP. As a consequence of the priva-
tization program launched in the 1990s, a significant portion of public services was transferred to 
private investors under long-term concession agreements. This was the case in the transmission and 
distribution of electricity, roads, railroads and telecommunications. However, the State remained as 
an important player in certain strategic sectors such as electricity and oil & gas, in which State-ow-
ned companies play relevant roles competing with private concessionaires.
The 1990’s privatization program can be considered successful in many dimensions. It was able to 
attract more than USD 73 billion in investments between 1995 and 2002. Additionally, it allowed 
expanding access and improving quality of service provision. Some sectors also experienced great 
network expansion, such as the power grid. 
However, the country has been facing huge challenges lately. Private investments in infrastructure 
have been declining significantly in the latest years. As a result, Brazil is lagging behind other BRIC 
countries. 
In June 2015, the federal government launched a new program to attract almost R$ 200 billion 
investments in logistics, including roads, ports, railways and airports. However, the political and 
economic scenarios are challenging, characterized by fiscal constraints and budgetary unbalance. 
The next volume of Network Industries’ Quarterly will comprise papers that shall endow readers a 
broad sense of what has happened in terms of public utilities’ investment in Brazil and the trends 
for the future. Editors have invited specialists to present their perspectives on different sectors and 
subjects, such as concession agreements, inter-sectoral regulation, transport integration, universali-
zation, and governance of State-owned companies. 
The Network Industries Quarterly carries an ISBN number and is published by Ecole Polytechnique 
Fédérale Lausanne (EPFL) and the Florence School of Regulation (European University Institute). Pu-
blished four times a year and distributes to approx. 6000 interested subscribers worldwide, the NIQ 
is included in Cadmus, the EUI’s Research Repository. You can find the latest issues of the NIQ here:
• Vol 17 - no 3 - 2015 – Regulation of Infrastructure Industries in Emerging Countries 
• Vol 17 - no 2 - 2015 – Urban Energy Transition 
• Vol 17 - no 1 - 2015 – Network Industries in Eurasia  
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